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Advanced nations and 
environmental protection:
The challenge of globalisation
Martin Jänicke*
Over the last few years, we have witnessed more and more fears that the nation state 
and its ability to set demanding standards in fields like environmental policy has diminished 
in the context of globalisation. There is, on the other hand, the hopeful prognosis of 
neo-classical economists that the same globalisation will be connected with deregulation 
and fundamental reduction of the role of government. Neither the fear nor the hope of a 
withering away of the nation state in times of globalisation are supported by empirical 
research. States in concert have expanded and co-ordinated their regulatory powers. And 
it is only the nation state, the guarantor of diverse societal interests that has the compe­
tence, the resources, the power and legitimacy to regulate the actions of disparate actors 
who might otherwise destroy shared environmental resources. There is remarkable poten­
tial, at least in the advanced OECD countries, to promote change through the adoption 
of a pioneering policy, the stimulation of international competition and the diffusion of 
best practice. This potential of the highly advanced countries may be seen as a moral 
obligation to assume a higher responsibility for global environmental development. The 
advanced nations cannot hide behind the fictitious monster of globalisation, seemingly 
legitimising any kind of inactivity. On the contrary, it is their obligation to provide the 
world with better ‘demonstration effects’, with a better model of production and consump­
tion, overcoming the resource and environment intensive model of the past.
* Professor of Political Sciences, Freie Universität Berlin.
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The subject is still highly relevant, since the debate has taught us valuable 
lessons regarding the role of the nation state in the context of globalisation.
I would like to present ten theses regarding the role of the nation state in 
global environmental policy. My basis is mainly composed of cross-national 
studies, partly conducted by the Environmental Policy Research Unit of the 
Free University of Berlin.
1) The open (‘globalised’) national economy needs and is charac­
terised by strong government, both in size and scope
This is contrary to the thinking of many neo-classical economists. There 
are cross- national studies showing that public expenditures in open econo­
mies in the OECD tend to be relatively higher (Cameron 1978, Garret 1998, 
Bernauer 2000). But it seems plausible to assume both a larger size and a 
larger scope of government activities in countries being highly integrated into 
the international economy. Open economies need:
• a well-developed infrastructure for successful international competition, 
that translates into more money and more public activities in fields such 
as education, R&D or transportation.
• the compensation of distributional and other effects of rapid structural 
changes connected, for example, with a low degree of protection of dome­
stic industries.
• more regulatory activities of all kinds necessary to adapt to international 
developments (e.g. standards).
2) The nation state is both the subject and the object of global envi­
ronmental policy learning and lesson-drawing
The national government is the subject of policy learning on how to solve 
environmental problems. At the same time, national governments are looking 
for best practice, observing other governments (Rose 1993, Bennett 1991, 
Kern et al. 2001). Successful environmental policy innovations -the introduc­
tion of new institutions, instruments, or strategies- are thereby often adopted 
by other governments. This improvement by imitation can be conceived as 
horizontal policy learning. It is an important mechanism of global environmen­
tal policy development and policy convergence. International institutions such
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as the OECD, UNEP or special regimes play an important role as policy 
arenas for pioneers and as agents for the diffusion of environmental policy 
innovations. This role seems to be more important than the creation of policy 
innovations by the international institutions themselves. Figure 1 shows some 
examples of the diffusion of environmental policy innovations -such as Envi­
ronmental ministries or green plans from pioneer countries to the rest of the 
world. The speed of diffusion has increased in the 1990s, strongly supported 
by the Rio process. This may imply capacity building at the national level, 
even if the divergence of capacities (beneath the convergent policy patterns) 
remains considerably high.
Figure 1:
Global Diffusion of Environmental Policy Innovations
Year of Introduction
Source: Busch & Jörgens 2002
3) Policies are differently affected by globalisation
The international pressure on wages, taxes on mobile sources and social 
security provisions is a stark reality in times of globalisation (Scharpf 1998). 
Environmental, but also health or security standards have their own (e. g. 
WTO) rules and their own logic in international regulatory competition. The
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 07/06/2020 15:54:57 |
146 Martin Jänicke
reasons why environmental policy is a particular case seem to be extremely 
important and need special explanation:
4) There is no ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental policy - but why?
Several empirical cross-national studies have rejected the RTB-hypothesis 
(see box).
Many arguments are well-known today (Vogel 2001, Wheeler 2001, Drez- 
ner 2001):
No international race to the bottom:
• ‘We find no race to the bottom...countries with more open trade re­
gimes have more stringent regulations’ (Elisie & Fredricksson 1998).
• National environmental pioneer policy can create ‘first-mover advan­
tages’ (Ashford 1979, Porter & van der Linde 1995, Wallace 1995).
• Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Thailand ‘are fast adopting indus­
trial pollution control standards similar to those in developed coun­
tries’ (Hettige et al. 1996).
• Strict environmental policy is no strong incentive to de-locate ‘dirty 
industries’ into developing countries with re-imports into rich coun­
tries (Jaffe et al. 1995, Jänicke et al. 1997).
Countries and companies that trade with countries with strict regulations 
tend to have stricter policies themselves (Eliste & Fredricksson 1998, Foljan- 
ty-Jost 1997) - the largest markets are rather strictly regulated. The globali­
sation of environmental policy has partly changed the framework conditions 
of the world market (Jänicke & Weidner 1997, Weidner & Jänicke 2002, 
Vogel 2001). Regulatory competition in the environment often creates first- 
mover advantages for national economies. This is a part of global competition 
(Porter 1991, Wallace 1995) and is essential to the development of ‘environ­
mental lead markets’ (Jänicke & Jacob 2001). Strict environmental regula­
tions (within limits) remain a possibility to protect national industries. Mul­
tinationals tend to use the same standards everywhere (Wheeler 2000). Dif­
ferences in environmental standards tend to decrease; on the whole, they are 
less important than differences e. g. in labour costs or taxes.
I would like to add two arguments:
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• The environmental issue has become a significant dimension of general 
technological progress. Forty percent of all innovations in 2010 are pro­
jected to be relevant to environmental improvement (Faucheux 2000).
• The environmental issue has become important in the international 
competition for innovation - there is a close correlation between strict 
environmental regulation and competitiveness.
5) Pioneer countries in environmental policy are highly competitive
The Global Competitive Report shows a remarkably high correlation (R2 
= 0.89) between ambitious environmental policy and the competitiveness of 
a country (Global Competitiveness Report 2000). Other studies have revealed 
a similar relationship (Sturm et al. 2000). Of course, this is no causal proof. 
The causal relation can go in both directions; also, third factors (e. g. the GNP 
per capita) may be important. But in light of such a correlation, no one can 
convincingly insist on the traditional economic argument of an immanent 
contradiction between competitiveness and a demanding environmental po­
licy. The strong correlation of the ‘third factor’ GNP can be explained by the 
following formula: Highly developed countries are characterised by both high 
perceived environmental pressure and high capacity to react.
6) Globalisation has created a policy arena for pioneer countries, at 
least in environmental policy
The pioneering environmental policy of certain highly developed countries 
has always been possible since 1970. The influence of small innovative coun­
tries in global policy has never before been as important as today in the field 
of environmental policy (Andersen & Liefferink 1997, Jänicke & Weidner 
1997, Jänicke & Jacob 2001). This means that political competition and the 
pioneer roles of countries have become relevant. But political competition 
needs an arena. The Johannesburg Summit may be used as an example. Here 
the situation has improved since the end of the Cold War (and its dichotomic 
policy arena). International institutions like the OECD or the UNEP, but also 
global networks of all kinds provide a basis for benchmarking and competition 
in global environmental policy. The hard core is regulatory competition giving 
support to domestic innovative industries or protecting the national régula-
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tory culture against pressures to adapt to policy innovation from abroad. This 
countervailing mechanism against the neglect of environmental considera­
tions in the global economy may not be strong enough, but it can be improved.
National Environmental Regulations and Competitiveness:
• ‘How an industry responds to environmental problems may, in fact, 
be a leading indicator of its overall competitiveness’ (Porter & van 
der Linde 1995).
• ‘...tough regulations will stimulate innovations, making firms gene­
rally fitter and more competitive’ (Wallace 1995).
• The ecologically innovative position of Japan’s main export branches 
‘was not brought about by ...political pressure, but rather by the...fear 
of decreased competitiveness in the European market’ (Foljanty-Jost 
1997).
• ‘...measures for environmental protection (that) act as trade barrier 
will be the international trend. Thus...Korea will...strengthen envi­
ronmental policy measures...to improve the...competitiveness of Ko­
rean companies’ (Korean Ministry of the Environment 1995).
7) New technologies as a rule start from national ‘lead markets’
The ecological modernisation of the world market depends on national 
lead markets for environmental innovations (Jänicke & Jacob 2001, Beise 
2001). A lead market is ‘the core of the world market where the local users 
are early adopters of an innovation on an international scale’ (Beise 1999: 4). 
Well-known examples include the United States as a lead market for the 
Internet, Japan as a lead market for fax machines, or Finland as a lead market 
for mobile phones. Empirically, lead markets are characterized by high per- 
capita income, demanding, innovative buyers, high-quality standards and 
pressure for change (see also F. Meyer-Krahmer 2000).
Lead markets for environmental technologies, however, are characterised 
by additional factors. They are typically not only stimulated by higher envi­
ronmental preferences of consumers in that country, but also by special pro­
motional measures or by political intervention in the market. A lead market 
for environmental innovations relates to global environmental needs and is
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-due to market failures- strongly dependent on government support, some­
times also on support from NGOs such as Greenpeace or the media.
Here again the role of the highly developed nation state and of pioneer 
countries is crucial: The global economy and its multinational enterprises are 
still in need of locations where the risky take-off of a new environmental 
technology finds public support and innovative buyers who are willing to pay 
a higher price and accept the teething problems of that technology, before it 
becomes cheap and effective enough to succeed in global markets. The regu­
lators in Denmark and Germany created favourable market conditions and 
the customers of electricity in both countries were willing to bear the high 
price for wind-power technology until it became competitive and profitable 
in the global market.
8) Environmental policy innovation, as well as regression, originate 
primarily at the national level
In an expert inquiry in twenty different countries, we asked the partici­
pants: ‘What are the main restrictive sectors in environmental protection?’ 
The answer was: First, the energy sector; second, road congestion; third, 
agriculture; fourth, the construction sector (Jänicke & Weidner 1997). These 
are actually sectors that are not under tough global competition; one could 
even say that the contrary is true (agriculture, the power industry, and the 
construction industry strongly depend on public or regulated demand). Quite 
often it is again the nation state that resists international regulation: countries 
such as the US, Japan, the UK or, more recently, Denmark are examples of 
the double option of either being an innovator or a laggard in environmental 
policy.
9) The nation state will remain the ‘local hero’, not least in the field 
of environmental protection
There is no functional equivalent to national governments as highly visible, 
legitimised and competent territorial actors and protectors (Willke 1992). To 
whom could we address our complaints on environmental violations or issues 
such as BSE if not to this actor? Governments, on the other hand, have no 
exit option. They need both a material and a political basis. They do not
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respond to economic pressure alone. The legitimation they need necessitates 
a broader orientation. The environment is an aspect that cannot be ignored. 
Therefore, national governments try to seek compromises between the eco­
nomy and the ecology. The answer is technology. Insofar as technology can 
provide solutions to environmental problems (in many fields we need more 
far-reaching ‘structural’ solutions), the potential of national policy action is 
stronger than generally assumed. This solution, however, is essentially restric­
ted not only by the general availibility of technology, but also to the more 
advanced countries.
10) Global environmental governance strongly depends on both the 
competence and creativity of national governments and the interna­
tional system as a complex mechanism of policy diffusion and co-or­
dination
Of course, this (‘horizontal’) view on the role of national governments is 
no alternative to the (‘vertical’) view on international institutions. The more 
interesting question is whether international regulation or the competitive 
role of pioneer countries represents the main catalyst for global environmen­
tal policy development. At the Johannesburg Summit, the European Union 
(strongly influenced by the German government) has for the first time gone 
beyond the minimalist global consensus by stressing its pioneer role. Together 
with a large group of countries, it is committed to following an ambitious 
policy in support of renewable energies.
This paper has underlined the role of the pioneers of innovation and 
diffusion. We need a lot more research on the role of different national 
policies, as well as on the mechanism of political competition in the global 
arena to offer a satisfactory answer to the question. But even if the competi­
tive pressure (both in policy and technology) exerted by pioneers in environ­
mental policy would prove to be the strongest driving force, international 
institutions would still play an important role as policy arenas and as agents 
of diffusion.
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Two Approaches to Global Environmental Policy:
• ‘Governance by international regulations’: Focus on international insti­
tutions, negotiations and regulations and their effects on national 
policies (e.g. Kyoto protocol)
- Main perspective: vertical processes, bottom-up, top down
- International consensus on a low level
• ‘Governance by diffusion’: Influence of pioneer countries in terms of 
the diffusion of environmental policy innovations (e.g. green tax reform)
- Main perspective: horizontal processes, best practice, international 
transfer mechanisms, competitive mechanisms (benchmarking, markets)
- Pioneer policy on a high level
Jänicke / FFU 2000
Conclusions
This short presentation should not be misconstrued as painting an optimi­
stic picture of globalisation. In general, we are not very successful in the field 
of environmental protection. Global economic development increases both 
the level of environmental pressure (e.g. in the field of transportation) and 
the capacity to react to environmental problems. Environmental policy may 
never win the race between these two tendencies. However, the question is 
whether globalisation is the main problem.
In sum, neither the increased importance of global markets nor the glo­
balisation of political governance have weakened the role of national govern­
ments. ‘...[T]he economic dimensions of globalisation have had little, if any, 
impact on lowering national regulatory standards, while the social and politi­
cal dimensions of globalisation have, on balance, contributed to the streng­
thening of national regulatory standards’ (David Vogel 2001). ‘States in 
concert’ have expanded and co-ordinated their regulatory powers. And it is 
only the state, the guarantor of diverse societal interests, that has the compe­
tence, the resources, the power and the legitimacy ‘to regulate the actions of 
disparate actors who, in their pursuit of individual gain, might otherwise 
destroy shared environmental resources’ (Raustiala 1997).
One important reservation, however, needs to be put forth: It is the highly
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developed nation state which has preserved or even increased its capacity in 
the context of globalisation. The situation in the less developed countries is 
quite different.
Keeping this in mind, we could draw two political and normative conclu­
sions from the ten statements mentioned above:
First, there is a remarkable potential in the advanced OECD countries to 
promote change through the adoption of a pioneering policy, the stimulation 
of international competition and the diffusion of best practice. This may 
sometimes be more helpful than relying only on weak and/or on weakly-im­
plemented treaties such as the Kyoto protocol.
Second, this potential of the highly advanced countries may be seen as a 
moral argument to assume a higher responsibility for global environmental 
development. The advanced nations cannot hide behind the fictitious monster 
of globalisation, seemingly legitimising any kind of inactivity. On the contrary, 
it is their obligation to provide the world with better ‘demonstration effects’, 
with a better model of production and consumption, overcoming the resource 
and environment intensive model of the past.
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